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Windows Workstation | Microsoft Sentinel "Honeytoken Queried via LDAP" False Positive

This article explains why Microsoft Sentinel “Honeytoken queried via LDAP” alerts appear with the Liongard Windows Workstation Inspector, how Domain Extraction triggers LDAP queries, and how to resolve this false positive.

Updated this week

Overview 💥

Partners and their customers may receive security alerts from Microsoft Sentinel (or similar SIEM platforms) flagging high-volume LDAP traffic originating from endpoints where the Liongard Agent is installed.

These alerts typically present as:

  • Sentinel Incident: "Honeytoken was queried via LDAP"

  • Event Classification: T1087.002 — Domain Account Enumeration (MITRE ATT&CK)

  • Source Process: windows-workstation-inspector.exe or LiongardAgent.exe

  • Alert Severity: Low to Medium

  • Trigger: During or shortly after a Liongard scheduled inspector check-in

Confirmed Safe:

This activity is not malicious. The LDAP queries are generated by the Liongard Windows Workstation Inspector as part of its normal domain data collection process.

Screenshots show the Sentinel Incidents dashboard where alerts appear.


Microsoft Sentinel Overview showing incidents and alerts summary where honeytoken alerts may appear.

Screenshot of the Incidents section in the Microsoft Sentinel Overview page.


Screenshot of Analytics screen in Defender portal.

Why This Happens? 🤔

Domain Extraction Feature

The Windows Workstation Inspector supports a feature called Domain Extraction that collects domain identity information such as:

  • Domain Users

  • Security Groups

  • Organizational Units (OUs)

When enabled, the inspector performs a broad LDAP query against the Active Directory domain.

Example command:

windows-workstation-inspector.exe <INSPECTOR_ID> --enableDomainExtraction true

Because this query enumerates all domain objects, it may also query honeytoken accounts configured in the environment.

Security monitoring tools such as Microsoft Sentinel detect this activity and may flag it as: MITRE ATT&CK: T1087.002 – Domain Account Discovery

⚠️ Sentinel cannot distinguish between authorized IT management tools and malicious reconnaissance, which results in a false positive alert.


Liongard Agent Behavior 🧑‍🏫

Understanding the expected behavior of the Liongard Agent helps determine whether activity is legitimate.

What the Liongard Agent Does (and Does Not Do)

The Liongard Agent DOES

The Liongard Agent Does NOT

Perform scheduled LDAP queries to enumerate domain accounts and groups

Move laterally between hosts or authenticate to other machines

Query all domain objects as part of domain extraction

Execute payloads, scripts, or commands outside its inspector bundle

Report collected data outbound to api.eu1.app.liongard.com (HTTPS/443)

Access, modify, or exfiltrate user data, files, or emails

Run as a scheduled service under the configured service account

Escalate privileges beyond what the service account holds

Detect and report changes in installed software, users, and config

Communicate with any destination other than Liongard's cloud API


Expected Network Behaviour 🧑‍💻

All Liongard Agent communication is outbound only, over HTTPS (port 443), to:

  • api.eu1.app.liongard.com — EU tenants

  • api.app.liongard.com — US tenants

The agent sends periodic heartbeats (every 3 minutes) and inspector results. It does not open inbound ports, communicate peer-to-peer between agents, or make direct network connections to domain controllers. LDAP queries are made locally on the workstation using the Windows LDAP API.

Hybrid AD Joined Devices

LDAP activity is expected and more frequent on devices that are Microsoft Entra Hybrid Joined (previously Hybrid Azure AD Joined), as these devices have line-of-sight to both on-premises Active Directory and Azure AD. This is consistent behaviour and does not indicate misconfiguration.


Network Requirements

The Liongard Agent communicates outbound only over HTTPS.

Required endpoints:

api.app.liongard.com api.instanceprefix.app.liongard.com

Required port:

TCP 443 (HTTPS)

Agent behavior includes:

  • Heartbeat every 3 minutes

  • Scheduled inspector check-ins

  • No inbound ports required

  • No peer-to-peer communication

💡 LDAP queries occur locally via the Windows LDAP API, not through direct network communication initiated by the agent.


Steps to Resolve 👨‍🔧

Option 1 — Suppress the Alert in Microsoft Sentinel (Recommended)

The recommended resolution is to exclude Liongard processes from the Sentinel analytic rule.

Step 1 — Locate the Analytic Rule

In Microsoft Sentinel:

  1. Navigate to Analytics

  2. Select Active Rules

  3. Locate the rule:

Honeytoken was queried via LDAP

Step 2 — Add Process Exclusion

Edit the rule and add the following filter:

| where InitiatingProcessName !in ("windows-workstation-inspector.exe","LiongardAgent.exe")

If your query uses a different field:

| where ProcessName !contains "windows-workstation-inspector" | where ProcessName !contains "LiongardAgent"

KQL Query Editor in Sentinel

Screenshot of the KQL queries page in the Defender portal.

Step 3 — Optional: Exclude the Liongard Service Account

If a dedicated Liongard service account is used:

| where AccountName != "<liongard-service-account>"

⚠️ Important:
Only exclude the service account from this specific analytic rule.

Do not disable monitoring for the account across all Sentinel rules.

Step 4 — Validate the Resolution

  1. Save the updated analytic rule

  2. Wait for the next Liongard inspection cycle

  3. Confirm the alert no longer triggers

  4. Close the incident as False Positive

Option 2 — Disable Domain Extraction

If your SOC policy requires that honeytoken accounts must never be queried, Domain Extraction can be disabled.

⚠️ Note: Disabling this feature prevents Liongard from collecting domain user and group information.

✅ Steps

  1. Log in to the Liongard platform

  2. Navigate to: Admin → Inspectors → Windows Workstation

  3. Locate the inspector configuration for affected endpoints

  4. Disable Domain Extraction.

  5. Save the configuration


Restoring Agents After Security Isolation 🌟

If machines were isolated after the alert, the Liongard Agent may appear Offline.

Common errors in agent logs:

dial tcp: lookup api.eu1.app.liongard.com: no such host context deadline exceeded dial tcp x.x.x.x:443: connectex: access permissions error

Resolution 🤩

  1. Remove the machine from restricted network policies

  2. Allow outbound HTTPS access to:

api.app.liongard.com api.eu1.app.liongard.com

3. Restart the Liongard Agent service:

Services → LiongardAgent → Restart

The agent should reconnect within 3 minutes.


Best Practices For Prevention 🚀

Recommendation

Benefit

Add Liongard process exclusion in Sentinel

Prevent recurring false positive alerts

Use a dedicated Liongard service account

Enables targeted SIEM exclusions

Whitelist Liongard API endpoints

Prevents agent connectivity issues

Document Liongard processes in SOC runbooks

Reduces investigation time

Review Domain Extraction configuration

Ensures LDAP queries are expected


Reference Information 🤓

Item

Value

Inspector

Windows Workstation Inspector

Inspector Process

windows-workstation-inspector.exe

Agent Process

LiongardAgent.exe

Agent Log Path

C:\Program Files (x86)\LiongardInc\LiongardAgent\Logs\

API Endpoint (US)

api.app.liongard.com

API Endpoint (EU)

api.eu1.app.liongard.com

Required Port

TCP 443

MITRE Technique

T1087.002 – Domain Account Discovery

Sentinel Rule

Honeytoken was queried via LDAP

Supported Devices

Windows 10 / Windows 11

Support Contact

support@liongard.com or via the Liongard Partner Portal.

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